2.2.6. The Republic

Plato's Republic presents us with a different picture of Socrates than the one we have drawn from the previous three dialogues. Many elements of this picture are consistent with our portrait of Socrates as jnani, but the Republic taken as a whole introduces a jarring note. The Republic is unusual amongst Socratic dialogues for placing Socrates in the first person, so one might suspect that it would provide the more reliable evidence about him. However, the essential problem with it, from the perspective of mysticism, is that it is Utopian. In fact it is one of the earliest Utopian works and highly influential through Western political history. The central proposition is the foundation of a State based on 'philosopher-kings', where the term 'philosopher' here easily translates to mystic, as the following statement from Socrates shows:

Because the true philosopher, as you know, Adeimantus, whose mind is on higher realities, has no time to look at the affairs of men, or to take part in their quarrels with all the jealousy and bitterness they involve. His eyes are turned to contemplate fixed and immutable realities, a realm where there is no injustice done or suffered, but all is reason and order, and which is the model which he imitates and to which he assimilates himself as far as he can. For is there any way to stop a man assimilating himself to anything with which he enjoys dealing? [73]

The description of a philosopher, whose mind is on higher realities and whose eyes are turned to contemplate fixed and immutable realities is consistent with mysticism, but the thrust of the Republic, that such individuals should head the State is unusual in mysticism. Krishna, according to the Gita and the Mahabharata played an active role in the great war of Kurukshetra (though his actions were certainly not that of the average local king), and Mohammed led his tribe to military victory in the Middle East. Socrates himself was a foot-soldier. But a philosopher-king? He even admits that most philosophers 'are rogues', [74] and that the 'divine sign' is too rare to save most of them from corruption: 'My own divine sign, I think, hardly counts, as hardly anyone before me has had it.' [75]

The picture we have of Socrates' character, independent of mysticism and philosophy, is that of a frugal and hardy nature, at home in the army or in discussion with citizens from the humblest cobbler to the statesmen of the time, a welcome guest at a drinking party, and always with people (there is nothing in Plato to suggest that Socrates was any kind of recluse). None of this fits well with a man who "has no time to look at the affairs of men"; on the contrary he is passionately interested in men, and even mentions in the Phaedrus: "Now the people in the city have something to teach me, but the fields and trees won't teach me anything." [76] But the last thing that his involvement with the citizens of Athens seems to be about in his actual life is to (a) rule them and (b) withdraw to solitary contemplation to achieve that.

The Utopian nature of The Republic would be an odd note for any mystic to strike, because of their insistence on the 'other world' (or non-material reality) if via negativa (and this is Socrates' theme in the Phaedo) or their insistence on the natural world as it is if via positiva. A more typical response to politics is Jesus' "Render unto Caesar that which is Caesar's" (and incidentally the source of much popular criticism, from Martin Scorcese's The Last Temptation of Christ to Monty Python's The Life of Brian). Socrates tells us in the Apology that he quit politics in fact because he wanted a long life. So is The Republic a musing by a mystic on an ideal society? If so, then why make the assumption: "So philosophy is impossible among the common people."? [77] Surely the ideal society for a mystic is one where everyone is lead to 'philosophy' (read mysticism for now)? But the ideal state we learn of is strictly stratiated into the philosopher-kings, the auxiliaries (those who are not full philosophers but carry out the running of the state and its defence) and the common people, farmers, tradesmen and so on.

But worse is to come. The ideal state as described in The Republic is quite clearly totalitarian, in fact differing from historical examples only by the replacement of a fascist dictator with one or more philosopher-kings. The rulers in Socrates' version are of course benign, but the instruments they use are recognisably totalitarian: the strict control over education (especially reading material), the issue of propaganda in the form of suitable 'myths', the censorship of the arts and its subordination to the goals of the state, and the practice of eugenics, including infanticide. Even enthusiastic Plato scholars admit that these elements are problematic, but since the second world war a number of commentators have focused in more depth on the totalitarianism in The Republic (though not from the perspective of mysticism). These include Toynbee's A Study of History, R.H.S. Crossman's Plato Today, and Bertrand Russell's Philosophy and Politics. However, Sir Karl Popper has been the most vociferous critic, in his The Open Society and its Enemies. He examines the views of a number of Plato apologists and comes to this conclusion: "In spite of such arguments, I believe that Plato's political programme, far from being morally superior to totalitarianism, is fundamentally identical to it." [78] Popper believes that Plato was reacting to the Heraclitean philosophy of flux, and was seeking the "possibility of arresting all political change". [79] I.M.Crombie, on the other hand, suggests that Plato was trying to find an accommodation between "the theories of Heraclitus and the practice of Socrates." [80]

A good coverage of the arguments for and against Plato as a totalitarian are to be found in Plato, Popper, and Politics, a collection of fifteen essays by scholars across the spectrum of opinion, including Popper. [81] In one of these essays G.R.Morrow makes this point: "Now the heart and centre of the Nazi and Communist admiration for Plato, and of the American liberal's repudiation of him, is of course, the idealization of absolutism in the Republic, the doctrine that government is a high art that can only be entrusted to an elite group, who must not be hampered by the rules that men call laws." [82] Morrow goes on to defend Plato by pointing out that in Laws (a much later work) Plato modifies this stance by saying "There is no mortal soul that can bear supreme and irresponsible power without losing his wisdom and integrity," (Laws 691c), and providing a whole system of laws that would provide the necessary checks and balances. Where this defence falls down, I think, is that in real life laws arise out of the affairs of men, rather than from the Gods, as Plato states at the outset of the Laws (624a). However, this argument is not central to our enquiry, and I wish only to make one more comment on the Laws: that by the very laws on impiety that Plato proposes in this late work (Laws 909) Socrates would have been condemned to death, despite the defence by Plato in the early work the Apology. (I challenge anyone to prove otherwise, except in the case that Plato himself is the prosecutor.)

Returning to eugenics (the science of improving the human stock, according to Sir Francis Galton, coiner of the term in 1883 [83]), we find that in the post-Nazi era the term has thankfully a negative connotation, but it is easy to forget that for many so-called liberals in the early part of the twentieth century it was seen as an answer to many of society's ills. Huxley and Orwell subscribed to it and so did Sir Winston Churchill, and it is only due to the veto of his cabinet that he failed to implement policies of selective sterilisation of criminals and gypsies. Oddly enough, despite the substantial section of the Republic devoted to eugenic ideas, Galton makes no mention of the Republic, and neither do any of the other texts I have consulted on the subject.

2.2.7. Preliminary Conclusions on Plato's Socrates

As stated earlier, The Republic gives us many elements that contribute to the portrait of Socrates as mystic (and the famous analogies of the Sun, the Line, and the Cave in The Republic are good examples), but the overall picture of its intent is anti-mystical. For while it may be possible to find another mystic with a Utopian outlook (I don't know of one), I don't believe it possible to find one with a totalitarian outlook. From this perspective it seems more likely that Plato himself was not a mystic, but reported at times with sensitivity on Socrates who was. Plato's intentions change throughout his works; as the direct influence of his master waned (Plato's Academy was founded about fourteen years after Socrates' death for example) Plato's concerns became more political. Before drawing any final conclusions however we should look at the other major source on Socrates' life, Xenophon.

2.3. Xenophon

Xenophon was an exact contemporary of Plato, being aged 29 when Socrates died (at the age of 70); Plato was 28. Xenophon was a country gentleman, a military man, and a historian, and provides us with a quite detailed portrait of Socrates through four dialogues, known in the Penguin translation as Socrates' Defence, Memoirs of Socrates, The Dinner-Party, and The Estate Manager. Socrates' Defence is the equivalent of Plato's Apology, and The Dinner-Party is the equivalent of Plato's Symposium (the differences in translation of the titles seem arbitrary but are useful in distinguishing the works of the two authors). The portrait of Socrates from Xenophon has none of the contradictions of Plato, none of the totalitarianism, and little indication of mysticism. Xenophon was a pragmatist with a utilitarian approach, a doer rather than a thinker, but with a sensitivity to the good that he found so developed in Socrates, albeit a good that must translate into the affairs of men and whose worth is judged from that perspective. His agenda is seen most plainly in The Estate Manager, though it is present in all the dialogues. John Philips Potter considers that "The opinions and conduct of Socrates may be safely estimated from Xenophon ... [he] respected his master too religiously to dare to interpolate any thing into his opinions." [84] This is probably a little optimistic; scholars down the ages have in fact argued for and against Xenophon's evidence, those arguing for (like Potter) on the basis that he was not independent enough of thought to interpolate, while those arguing against on the basis that he was not intelligent enough to understand Socrates. From the point of view of mysticism we learn little, not because Xenophon was not intelligent, but because he was clearly not mystically inclined. However, the consistency and pragmatism of Xenophon do give us a better picture of Socrates as a man than does Plato.

Xenophon's portrait shows us a Socrates who is visible (i.e. always amongst people), temperate (in all things, and in a highly considered manner), humorous (hilariously so at times, as when he calls himself a pimp [85] , and when he engages in a beauty competition with Critobulus [86]), engaging (in the sense of reaching out to actual and potential disciples), democratic (despite his association with aristocrats and tyrants), interested (in human affairs), and positive (he teaches piety through gratitude for a munificent universe). This passage shows his liking for company:

Moreover, he was always visible. For in the early morning he used to go on walks and to the gymnasium, and when the marketplace was full he was visible there, and for the remainder of the day he was always where he might be with the most people. [87]

Xenophon also shows a Socrates who is conventionally religious in his observances and obedience to religious law, though possessed in addition with the power of divination. Beyond this Xenophon does not speculate on areas we might consider mystical, and gives only a brief account of Socrates' philosophy:

I shall now try to describe how Socrates made his associates better at philosophical discussion. He believed that those who understood the nature of any given thing would be able to explain it to others as well, whereas it was no wonder, he said, if those who did not understand made mistakes themselves and misled other. Consequently, he never stopped investigating with the help of his companions the meaning of every single term. It would be laborious task to describe fully all the distinctions he drew; I shall mention only a few examples, which I think will serve to illustrate his method of inquiry. [88]

It is clear that while Xenophon had enormous respect for Socrates he was not interested in the 'laborious task' of reproducing his teachings. The essence of Xenophon's respect is probably captured in the passage where Lycon says at the end of The Dinner Party "I swear, Socrates, it does seem to me that you are a truly good man." [89]

Given Xenophon's character, there is nothing in his testimony that works against Socrates as mystic: around every great Master there are always those who are devoted and loyal but whose temperament inclines them to the practical and away from the mystical. However, although there is little directly mystical in Xenophon's portrait there are some pointers here and there, beyond the obvious references to Socrates' daimon. Firstly, Socrates had an estranging effect (allegedly) on his followers from their parents and relatives, reminiscent of a similar charge against Jesus:

Socrates' accuser said that he lowered the regard of his associates not only for their fathers, but also for their other relatives, by saying that it is not their relatives that help the victim of disease or litigation but doctors in the one case and competent advocates in the other. [90]

Socrates clearly believed that he offered something unique to his disciples that their relatives could not, and that it was as urgent as if they were facing disease or litigation. However he balances this elsewhere by praising the role of the parent, for example when remonstrating with his own son (who is indignant at his treatment from his mother Xanthippe). [91]

That the word 'disciple' may be better used for 'associates' (found in most translations) is illustrated by the way in which Euthydemus is shown by Socrates to have no 'real' knowledge, his initial dejection at this and abandonment of Socrates' company, only to return: "and from that time onwards, he never left him unless he was obliged to, and he even copied some of Socrates' practices." [92] In Xenophon, unlike in Plato, we find that Socrates uses what is known much later as the 'argument from design' to instil piety in his followers, and this is used on Euthydemus, taking up the whole of section 4.3 of the Memoirs of Socrates. This is too long to quote in full, but some of the positive and almost prayerful tone is captured in this passage:

And what of the fact that they [the gods] have equipped us with senses appropriate to the different kinds of beautiful and beneficial objects that surround us, so that by means of these senses we can enjoy all good things? And the fact that they have implanted in us reason, which enables us to think about and remember our sensations, and so discover the beneficial effects of each class of objects and devise various means for enjoying what is good and avoiding what is bad for us? [93]

In another parallel with Jesus, we find Socrates visiting a prostitute (or so we are meant to assume from the fact that she maintained a large household solely from the favours of wealthy men; perhaps 'courtesan' would be a better word). This is described in section 3.11 of the Memoirs, and finishes with the following exchange:

Theodote said, 'Why don't you help me in my hunt for friends, Socrates?
'I will, believe me', said Socrates, 'if you persuade me.'
'How can I persuade you?'
'You'll look to that yourself,' he said, 'and you'll find a way, if you need any help from me.'
'Then come and see me often,' she said.
'Well, Theodote,' replied Socrates, poking fun at his own avoidance of public life, 'it's not very easy for me to find the time for it. I have a great deal of public and private business that keeps me occupied and I have some girlfriends too, who will never let me leave them by day or night, because they are learning from me about love-charms and spells.'
'Do you really know about them too, Socrates?' she asked.
'Why do you suppose that Apollodorus here and Antisthenes never leave me? And that Cebes and Simmias come to visit me from Thebes? You may be sure that these things don't happen without a lot of love-charms and spells and magic wheels.'
'Lend me your magic wheel, then, so that I may spin it first for you.'
'Certainly not,' he said. 'I don't want to be drawn to you; I want you to come to me.'
'Very well, I will,' she declared. 'Only mind you let me in.'
'Yes, I'll let you in,' said Socrates, 'unless I have someone with me that I like better.' [94]

Socrates' 'girlfriends' are, of course, his disciples, and we can read this passage as the good-humoured 'fishing' for a new disciple that spiritual Masters are continuously engaged in. Socrates is clear that she must come to him and not the other way round though.

We also have a possible reference in Xenophon to one of Socrates' 'fits of abstraction', or, in our terms samadhi. Socrates is talking about dancing:

'... Don't you know that the other day Charmides here caught me dancing at daybreak?'


'Yes, indeed I did,' said Charmides, 'and at first I was astonished and afraid that you were out of your mind, but, when I heard you explain it to me in the way that you are doing now, I went home myself and well, I didn't dance, because I've never learned how, but I waved my arms about, because I knew how to do that!' [95]

If, and I grant that this is a big if, Socrates was prone to the kind of samadhi so well-documented in the case of Ramakrishna, then we can expect him to sometimes be still (as recorded in Plato) and sometimes to move in rapture, perhaps to 'wave' his arms about. Given that samadhi has not been widely understood in the West, and that it is rare occurrence anyway, we can expect both that witnesses may confuse it with dancing, and that Socrates may have encouraged this view because he had no other way of explaining it, or did not want to dwell on it.

None of the evidence from Xenophon is conclusive about Socrates' status as mystic of course, but we have seen that many passages can be read that way. What Xenophon gives us, and which I think is relatively reliable because of its consistency, is a quality of Socrates of balance. He is temperate, but does not approve of neglecting the body, he is humorous, but never at someone else's expense, he is curt if absolutely necessary (as with the entertainment manager at the Dinner-Party [96]), he is interested in human affairs to the degree that they can be made to embody the good, and above all seems equal to any situation (as we see with both the courtesan and at his trial).

3. Conclusions

3.1. Plato as Philosopher or Mystic

Having looked at the picture of Socrates drawn by Plato and Xenophon, we must come to a conclusion as to whether we can reasonably regard Socrates as a mystic. Because the main evidence for his mysticism comes from Plato, we need to carefully consider whether Plato himself was the mystic. While disagreeing with many of Bharati's claims, I think he has a valid point in saying that mystics are totally absorbed in mysticism (it was from this perspective that he made the comment on having no small-talk mentioned earlier). Plato, in his writings, certainly seems to show a mystical sensitivity in some passages, but these are mitigated against by his utopian, political, and totalitarian views in other passages. We can then propose two Platos; one is the mystic interested in immortality, the 'good', and the essence behind reality (the 'forms'), and the other is interested in a political solution to the problems of the contemporary State, based on 'philosopher-kings'. Conventionally these two Platos could be seen as complementary, and directly related, in the Western guise of 'philosopher', but from the history of mysticism this is not supportable. When a mystic expands the stage on which they teach or transmit their mystical wisdom, it is to give access to these teachings for the many, and not to create a constitution which limits this to a few and keeps the many in ignorance through the deliberate creation of myths and propaganda.

The Socratic dialogues of Plato, taken on their own, might leave us in doubt about the two Platos I propose here, but I think that if we add works such as the Laws, and, more importantly, his famous Seventh Letter, we are forced to choose Plato the politician. In the Seventh Letter he says: "When I was a young man I expected, like many others, to embark, as soon as I was my own master, on a political career." [97] We find that the political upheavals in Athens culminating in the execution of Socrates turned Plato to philosophy and formed his conviction that "the troubles of mankind will never cease until either true and genuine philosophers attain political power or the rulers of states by some dispensation of providence become genuine philosophers." [98] The Seventh Letter documents Plato's only, and disastrous, attempt to help put this into practice. Plato as a politician was then a failure, but as a political philosopher he ranks amongst those with the greatest and longest influence in the West. Bertrand Russell considers in fact that we are bequeathed five great philosophical contributions from Plato: (1) his Utopia, (2) his theory of ideas [forms], (3) his argument in favour of immortality, (4) his cosmogony, (5) his conception of knowledge as reminiscence rather than perception. [99] While philosophers (in the modern sense) clearly claim Plato to be of their own kind, others do claim Plato as mystic. Happold for example states that Plato is the 'Father of Christian Mysticism' [100], but this is hard to support: Eckhart (as jnani) may have drawn elements from Plato, but Rolle (as bhakti) did not. The evidence collected here does not support the view that Plato himself was a mystic.

3.2. Plato's Socratic Dialogues as a Proximity Text

If Plato is not himself a mystic, then we can consider his Socratic dialogues as constituting a proximity text as defined above. We know that Plato was only 28 when Socrates died, and that probably the bulk of his writings took place later than this, right into Plato's old age. Hence the early dialogues are probably the most reliable (as Vlastos points out in a slightly different context) as proximity texts. Do we find the contradictions, misunderstandings and adumbrations that we might expect in a proximity text in Plato? Of course we do. But, when we consider Plato's own genius, his mercurial mind (as shown in the great range of his subject matter, compared to say Xenophon), and the very definite evolving agenda of his own, we must say that it is not a proximity text of the first rank. While one might at first consider Plato's total absence as a character anywhere in his dialogues as the sort of modesty that led Mahendranath to give only the letter 'M' in authorship to his Gospel of Ramakrishna, one gradually realises that it is not due to modesty. Otherwise why should he use Socrates so barefacedly for his own evolving agenda? The absence of Plato is partly the style of the time (Xenophon, by contrast, appears several times in his dialogues, and gives his own opinions), but I find it a little dishonest.

A comparison has been made by Colin Wilson between the Plato/Socrates relationship and the Ouspensky/Gurdjieff one, [101] and commented upon by Georg Feuerstein [102] in the context of what he calls 'holy madness' or the rascal guru (Socrates as rascal guru is not so preposterous: think of his humorous claim to be a pimp). Ouspensky is very honest about his shortcomings with respect to the knowledge that Gurdjieff possesses, as this quote from In Search of the Miraculous shows (Gurdjieff is speaking):

"A great deal can be found by reading. For instance, take yourself: you might already know a great deal if you knew how to read. I mean that, if you understood everything that you have read in your life, you would already know what you are looking for now. If you understood everything you have written in your book, what is it called?" he made something altogether impossible out of the words "Tertium Organum" "I should come and bow down to you and beg you to teach me. But you do not understand either what you read or what you write." [103]

Ouspensky was a noted, though not mainstream, philosopher at the turn of the century, and rather immodestly titled his first major work Tertium Organum after Bacon's Novum Organum and Aristotle's Organum. His encounter with Gurdjieff may well have something in common with that between Plato and Socrates. It is not impossible to imagine Socrates making a similar comment to the one above on Plato's writings. However, Ouspensky devoted his later life to Gurdjieff, who gave his blessing to In Search of the Miraculous as an accurate summary of his teachings. It stands therefore as one of the best examples of a proximity text, alongside The Gospel of Ramakrishna. Plato's dialogues, on the evidence here stated, are a lesser case: his agenda is much further from Socrates' than Ouspensky's was from Gurdjieff's.

3.3. Xenophon's Evidence

If Plato's dialogues are a lesser case of a proximity text, then what of Xenophon's? They are, for sure, more consistent, and Xenophon's agenda is less intrusive and variable than Plato's, but there is not a lot of evidence for mysticism there. What is valuable is a warm and breathing portrait of Socrates as a man, all of which is consistent with him as mystic, but not proof. Given that a proximity text should at least in part set out to show the subject as mystic, we cannot give this status to Xenophon's dialogues, because Xenophon plainly is not conversant with or interested in the essential elements of mysticism, as Plato is.

3.4. Socrates as Mystic

How then shall we answer our question, is Socrates a mystic? If forced to a straight yes or no, then a yes is probably required on the evidence presented here. On the other hand we see that our evidence from Plato constitutes a lesser proximity text (as defined in this dissertation) and that we cannot count Xenophon's dialogues as a proximity text, though a useful portrait of the man. Clearly then, while we can add Socrates as a 'possible' to our roll-call of mystics, his is not the clear case that we derive where there are substantial first-order proximity texts or primary texts.

There are many useful issues that Socrates' case does raise for mysticism however. One of these is the whole concept of the jnani mystic in the West, and the relation of this to bhakti.

3.5. Socrates and Jesus

We can consider the relationship between jnani and bhakti in the context of comparisons made between Socrates and Jesus. In R.M.Wenley's Socrates and Christ he cites 'an extreme view' of R.W.Mackay: "To the truth already uttered in the Athenian prison, Christianity added little or nothing; except a few symbols, which though perhaps well calculated for popular acceptance, are more likely to perplex than instruct, and offer the best opportunity for priestly mystification." [104] Wenley's book attempts a refutation of this view, conceding the parallels, but concluding that they "hold of externals rather than essentials." [105] Montuori tells us that it was Justinius the Martyr who first established the parallels, and that reaction in Christian thought was generally divided between those who agreed and those who saw the teachings on immortality as pagan [106].

If we accept Socrates as jnani and perhaps the preceding mysticism of Heraclitus and Pythagoras as the same, then the impact of Christ on the West can be seen in terms of bhakti. There is no need then to see a rivalry between the two, or to labour over the parallels between the mens' lives and teachings (some of which we have pointed out here). From this perspective Christ brought to the Hellenic and Roman world a devotional outlook that took hold in a way that previous devotional practices had not. At the same time it could be said that it swept away the older jnani understandings, or rather forced them underground.

3.6. Jnani, Gnosis, and Philosophy in the West

But perhaps it was Plato that planted the seeds of the demise of jnani. If, as Popper claims, Plato was trying to find a bulwark against the Heraclitean flux, then it is in the philosophical element in Plato, not the mystical, that jnani became less understood. Brickhouse and Smith wish to make the dichotomy between divination and ratiocination, arguing against Vlastos that Socrates prioritised the former against the latter [107]. But I believe that the issue is much more subtle, and is better characterised as a dichotomy between philosophy (understood as ratiocination, or cogitation) and jnani. In James Beckman's The Religious Dimension of Socrates' Thought we find again that the dichotomy is between divination and ratiocination (expressed by Beckman as between religion and philosophy): he points out that "no philosopher, for instance, ever recommended praying to his philosophical ultimate." [108] If we accept the basis of jnani as non-devotional, then prayer does not come into it; instead we are in the territory of meditation, a defined in this dissertation.

Plato is in fact the source, or a source, of two mystical traditions in the West with a jnani orientation; Neoplatonism, and the Gnostic tradition. I would suggest that the confusion in Plato between philosophy (as we now understand it) and jnani is one reason why these traditions are not widely understood today. The rise of the devotional religion of Christianity is another reason.

3.7. Further Research

I believe that this inquiry into the possible mystical status of Socrates has brought to light some important further questions for mysticism in the West, as outlined above. An examination of Buddhist thought would be useful in this context for the fine-grained distinctions between ratiocination (or cogitation) and meditation, and the role of thought in preparing the mind for silence of the mind. This would help place Western philosophy in context. A clearer picture of the Indian view on jnani would be useful, and the exploration of Neoplatonism and Gnosticism in terms of the Buddhist and Hindu concepts would be valuable. Finally it might be possible to better judge the true role of jnani in the development of the West (giving us a better understanding of Eckhart for example) and its relationship with devotional mysticism.

As I have argued both for a clear distinction between jnani and bhakti and for their inseparable intertwining, perhaps one could find a route to the devotional for our predominantly lay culture through a better understanding of jnani. Our understanding of Socrates is dependent on the distinction between jnani and bhakti, and I believe that it is central to all understanding of mysticism.

References for Part 5

[73] Plato, The Republic, Trans.: Desmond Lee, London: Penguin Books, 1987, p. 236
[74] Plato, The Republic, Trans.: Desmond Lee, London: Penguin Books, 1987, p. 225
[75] Plato, The Republic, Trans.: Desmond Lee, London: Penguin Books, 1987, p. 231
[76] Plato, Phaedrus and Letters VII and VIII, Trans.: Walter Hamilton, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973, p. 26
[77] Plato, The Republic, Trans.: Desmond Lee, London: Penguin Books, 1987, p. 228
[78] Popper, Karl R. The Open Society and its Enemies, London: Routledge, 1945, Vol. 1, p. 75
[79] Popper, Karl R. The Open Society and its Enemies, London: Routledge, 1945, Vol. 1, p. 16
[80] Crombie, I.M., Plato, the Midwife's Apprentice, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964, p. 11
[81] Mambrough, Renford, (Ed.) Plato, Popper and Politics, Cambridge: Heffer, New York: Barnes and Noble, 1967.
[82] Morrow, G.R., 'Plato and the Rule of Law' in Mambrough, Renford, (Ed.) Plato, Popper and Politics, Cambridge: Heffer, New York: Barnes and Noble, 1967, p. 106
[83] Galton, Sir Francis, Essays in Eugenics, London: The Eugenics Society (Garland), 1909, p. 75
[84] Potter, John Philips, The Religion of Socrates, London: B. Fellows, 1831, footnote to p.10
[85] Xenophon, Conversations of Socrates, Trans.: Hugh Tredennick and Robin Waterfield, London: Penguin, 1990, The Dinner Party 3.10, p. 238
[86] Xenophon, Conversations of Socrates, Trans.: Hugh Tredennick and Robin Waterfield, London: Penguin, 1990, The Dinner Party section 5.
[87] Xenophon, Memorabilia, Trans.: Amy L. Bonnette, Icatha and London: Cornell University Press, 1994, p. 3
[88] Xenophon, Conversations of Socrates, Trans.: Hugh Tredennick and Robin Waterfield, London: Penguin, 1990, Memoirs of Socrates 4.6.1, p. 205
[89] Xenophon, Conversations of Socrates, Trans.: Hugh Tredennick and Robin Waterfield, London: Penguin, 1990, The Dinner Party 9.7, p. 265
[90] Xenophon, Conversations of Socrates, Trans.: Hugh Tredennick and Robin Waterfield, London: Penguin, 1990, Memoirs of Socrates, 1.2.47, p. 82
[91] Xenophon, Conversations of Socrates, Trans.: Hugh Tredennick and Robin Waterfield, London: Penguin, 1990, Memoirs of Socrates, 2.2, p. 109
[92] Xenophon, Conversations of Socrates, Trans.: Hugh Tredennick and Robin Waterfield, London: Penguin, 1990, Memoirs of Socrates, p. 190, see also the whole of section 4.2, starting p. 178
[93] Xenophon, Conversations of Socrates, Trans.: Hugh Tredennick and Robin Waterfield, London: Penguin, 1990, Memoirs of Socrates, p. 193
[94] Xenophon, Conversations of Socrates, Trans.: Hugh Tredennick and Robin Waterfield, London: Penguin, 1990, Memoirs of Socrates, p. 170
[95] Xenophon, Conversations of Socrates, Trans.: Hugh Tredennick and Robin Waterfield, London: Penguin, 1990, The Dinner Party 2.19, p. 234
[96] Xenophon, Conversations of Socrates, Trans.: Hugh Tredennick and Robin Waterfield, London: Penguin, 1990, The Dinner Party 6.8, p. 256
[97] Plato, Phaedrus and Letters VII and VIII, Trans.: Walter Hamilton, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973, p. 112
[98] Plato, Phaedrus and Letters VII and VIII, Trans.: Walter Hamilton, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973,p. 114
[99] Russell, Bertrand, A History of Western Philosophy, London, Sidney, Wellington: Unwin Paperbacks, 1989, p. 122
[100] Happold, F.C. Mysticism - a Study and and Anthology, Penguin Books, London, 1970, p. 176
[101] Wilson, Colin, The Outsider, London: Picador, 1978, p. 277
[102] Feuerstein, Georg. Holy Madness, London: Arkana, 1990, p. 55
[103] Ouspensky, P.D. In Search of the Miraculous - Fragments of an Unknown Teaching, Arkana, p. 20
[104] Wenley, R.M. Socrates and Christ, Edinburgh and London: Blackwood, 1889, p. 6
[105] Wenley, R.M. Socrates and Christ, Edinburgh and London: Blackwood, 1889, p. 9
[106] Montuori, Mario, Socrates-Physiology of a Myth', Amsterdam: J.C.Gieben, 1981, p. 6 and 7
[107] Brickhouse, Thomas, and Smith, Nicholas, Plato's Socrates, New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 190
[108] Beckman, James, The Religious Dimension of Socrates' Thought, Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 1979, p. 172

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